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Abstract 
 
Although Turkey has largely maintained the constitutional tradition inherited from the 
Ottomans, and has been ruled by the parliamentary system since its establishment, in 1923, the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), which is one of the most 
controversial political structures in Turkish political history, has changed the accustomed 
system into a Turkish type of presidential one. Furthermore, this important decision was taken 
in a plebiscite held under state of emergency conditions, after the failed coup attempt and in an 
authoritarian political atmosphere that has been gradually increasing for more than half a 
decade. In this regard, this article explains two major points; the constitutional history of 
contemporary Turkey with its Ottoman background, and the AKP’s political journey that is a 
swing from hope to oppression. Yet, additionally, the article clarifies the minuteae of the 
amended constitution which are related to human rights and liberties. Lastly, it argues that the 
proposed constitution will neither reveal a new system, nor will it constitute a democratic socio-
political environment and an advanced human rights constitution. 
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Introduction 
 
Turkey never had a perfectly functioning, institutionally balanced democracy; but beyond its 
problematic heritage, there has been a drastic decrease in fundamental principles like 
democracy, freedoms, human rights and the rule of law in recent years. This is not merely a 
simple and superficial claim but a well-founded fact based on both domestic and international 
research. For instance, the 2016 World Justice Project shows Turkey as the 99th among 113 
countries in its Rule of Law Index, making a strong emphasis on the political pressure exercised 
on the judiciary branch.i It is thus impossible to claim any status of legitimacy for the shrinking 
of democracy in Turkey up until the year 2017. Hence, all the anti-democratic practices had to 
be legitimized by utilizing exceptional cases. Now, however, all of these appeared in flesh and 
bones in a constitutional amendment package prepared within the first months of 2017 under 
the general consensus of the biggest political party in parliament, Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) and the tiniest one; the Nationalist Action Party 
(Millyetçi Hareket Partisi- MHP).  The constitutional amendments were put to a vote in a 
plebiscite on April 16 and only 51.4% of voters were persuaded to back this constitutional 
upheaval.ii 
 
Beyond the results of this plebiscite regarding constitutional change and the campaign period, 
this article argues that the 2017 constitutional amendments will not only remove the 
parliamentary system, but more essentially will take Turkey’s constitutional memory back to 
zero. Moreover, the article argues that, with the new constitutional regulations Turkey is about 
to past the point of no return in democracy, which will have a widespread effect primarily on 
human rights and liberties. In order to show this general frame, this study first deals with the 
constitutional history of contemporary Turkey by aiming to express the memory and experience 
of the founding constitutions. Secondly, it mentions the AKP’s story and highlights the 
difference between 2002 and 2017 in terms of its policies, discourses, and practices. After that 
it reveals how the new constitutional amendments are coherent with the AKP’s changing system 
of policy implementation and its impact on human rights and liberties.iii 
 
The Brief Constitutional History of Contemporary Turkey 
 
 Even though it was not among the fundamental pieces of Ottoman and Turkish modernization, 
the concept of democracy began to emerge in the second half of the 19th century. The late and 
slow democratization in the Ottoman era, however, gained a remarkable speed with the 
founding fathers of the Republic who exerted top-down reforms on it, which also meant that 
democracy in Turkey was established by the elites, and for the elites, thus making outside 
interventions much more difficult (Göle 1997). Still, the ending of single-party rule that lasted 
from 1923 to 1950 with a democratic election did not directly result in the system becoming 
relatively more democratic (Zürcher 2014). Understanding the fundamental reasons for this 
requires an analysis of Turkish political life in terms of democracy. 
 
Democracy’s adventure in Turkey started in the pre-Republican era, marked by the milestones 
of Sened-i Ittifak (The Deed of Alliance of 1808), Tanzimat Fermanı (Edict of Tanzimat 
Reforms of 1839), Islahat Fermanı (Edict of Islahat Reforms of 1856), I. Meşrutiyet (The First 
Constitutional Monarchy, 1876) and Meclis-i Umumi (The Constitution and General Assembly 
of 1876), and II. Meşrutiyet (The Reinstitution of the Constitution and the General Assembly 
in 1908). Tanzimat Fermanı, although presented as a grace of the Sultan, is considered a decree 
that guarantees the fundamental rights of all Ottoman subjects whether Muslim or non-Muslim. 
Created in the First Constitutional Era, the short-lived Meclis-i Mebusan (General Assembly) 
became the basis of the Grand National Assembly that was established on April 23, 1920. 
Kanun-i Esasi, declared in 1876, is also known as the first Constitutional experience in 
Ottoman-Turkish political life (Kayalı 1995). According to the constitution, the Sultan was 
extraordinary, the slightest transparency or accountability was improbable, and moreover, the 
mere idea of the formation of an Assembly under the authority of the ruler was beyond 
expectations (Weiker 1968, 456-457). 
 
The Teskilat-i Esasiye Law (General Constitution) of 1921 is a substantial step towards 
democracy, which adopted the Rousseauian principles of popular sovereignty and unity of 
powers. Along this line, the parliament held all the powers including the executive branch, 
which emerged as a separate power from within the legislative branch (Kardam and Cengiz 
2011). However, the ministers were chosen by the legislative body one by one. In general, the 
1921 Constitution stands out among the first stages of the development of democracy in the 
transition from the Ottoman sultanate to the Republican regime, in terms of establishing 
sovereignty on a “secular”iv basis like people or the nation instead of God.  
 
The other reforms complementing the principle of national sovereignty were the abolishing of 
the sultanate regime on November 1, 1922 and the declaration of the Republican regime on 
October 29, 1923. The law that announced the new regime and changed the constitution also 
introduced the system of the parliament electing the president from among its members, the 
president appointing a prime minister to be also confirmed by the parliament, and the cabinet 
of ministers being established by the prime minister (Koçak, 2005).  
 
The biggest step towards the principle of a secular state was made on March 3, 1924 with the 
abolishing of the Islamic caliphate in addition to some other major reforms (Öztürk 2016, 625). 
Individual and political rights and freedoms were established in the 1924 Constitution within 
the framework of citizenship of a single political society or nation. Both of these initial 
constitutions regulated the concept of “national sovereignty” entrenched within the existence 
of the parliament, asserting that the best way to secure the rights and freedoms of the citizens 
is the unconditional use of sovereignty by the parliament in the name of a nation that is assumed 
to be a single political body. On April 10, 1928, a constitutional amendment removed article 2 
declaring Islam to be the official religion, and article 26 granting parliament the responsibility 
of implementing the Sharia and in 1937, the principle of laicism was installed in the constitution 
together with the other principles (republicanism, nationalism, etatism, populism, and 
revolutionist), thus sealing the secularization process (Gözaydın 2008, 159-165). 
 
The 1924 Constitution’s national sovereignty principle, which gave the parliament 
unconditional and unshared authority, was turned into a tyranny of the majority in the Democrat 
Party era in the 1950s; thus creating serious issues in the areas of freedom and rights for the 
opposition (Ahmad 1991, 11-13). As a result, the 1961 Constitution written after the first 
military coup against the Democrat Party government included a reinterpretation and 
reregulation of national sovereignty and national will in a way to limit the powers of the political 
authority and reinforce social rights in addition to civil liberties (Belge 2006, 653-664). It was 
decided that national sovereignty would be exerted not only through parliament, but also 
through other mechanisms established in the constitution and always in a way compliant with 
the principles of the constitution. These mechanisms that were given the authority to share the 
exertion of national sovereignty included the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidency, the Supreme 
Court and independent courts, while the parliament itself was divided into two as the House of 
Legislation and the Senate in order to create a power balance within the legislative body. 
Additionally, the Constitutional Court was established in order to check that the laws were in 
compliance with the constitution. The 1961 Constitution, in short, was a transition from “a 
constitutional order that collects all the power in the hands of the parliament” with “an 
understanding of majoritarian democracy” to “a checks and balances” system attempting “to 
balance the power of the parliament through various constitutional institutions and civil society 
organizations” reflecting “an understanding of pluralist democracy.” (Özbudun 1993, 13-14). 
 
The amendments made to the 1961 Constitution after the March 12, 1971 military coup eased 
the restriction of freedoms while hampering the executive operations. The dual structure of the 
parliament was ended, and the executive branch was made more powerful vis-a-vis parliament 
and the judiciary (Demirel 2005, 250-252). When the 1982 Constitution was written following 
the military coup in 1980, the President was made more powerful specifically against the 
government in order to create a balance in the executive branch. The President’s position of 
monitoring and supervising the execution of the constitutional order was strengthened against 
the ruling party and the parliamentary majority. Following the major improvements especially 
on social rights in the previous constitution, the 1982 Constitution and its later amendments 
further developed and expanded individual rights and freedoms (Üskül 2006, 31-35). For 
example, the framework of freedom of thought and expression was expanded. And it was made 
a rule in the constitution that, with respect to human rights, the laws should abide by the 
international agreements that Turkey signed.v 
 
In short, what we see throughout the history of the Republic is a struggle to establish a 
representative parliamentary democracy, where popular will finds its place in the political 
system by way of the deputies elected by the people. Even the single-party rule until the mid-
1940s does not negate this generalization, nor the short-term military inventions as they did not 
lead to a fascist or socialist type regime of totalitarian dictatorship. The adoption and 
establishment of the separation of powers -which is a common feature of liberal democracies, 
the installment of judiciary control to a great extent, the securing of basic rights and freedoms 
in the constitution, and the founding of the constitutional court are also additional achievements 
of democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, after 1960, this liberal parliamentary democracy gained 
a more pluralist and libertarian nature that emphasized checks and balances. 
 
AKP in Turkish Politics: A Dream, A Struggle, Then a Tool of Oppression  
 
AKP was founded in 2001 and was to create a heritage of unprecedented electoral success in 
Turkish political history. It is near-impossible to evaluate this political success without mention 
of the performance of its founding leader who has always maintained the role of major decision-
maker. Even when he became President and had to cut off all partisan ties, Erdoğan did not 
relinquish the grip he had on his party. Despite AKP’s roots in political Islam, the party’s 
leadership claimed it had changed and started playing to the centre-right of the political 
spectrum. Defining themselves as conservative democrats, the ruling elite of the party started 
making policies that compromised the secular system of the country, embraced a West leaning 
neo-liberalism and created significant momentum for European Union (EU) membership, and 
eventually crafted the party with a reformist vision.  
 
AKP’s 2002 victory owed a great deal to the emergence of a new middle class made up of 
conservative small-business owners in Anatolia. Market-friendly liberals and left leaning 
secularists also celebrated its victory over the ultra-secularist Kemalist bureaucracy mainly 
because of a successful management of the economy and EU reforms (Çarkoğlu 2002, 30-41). 
The Kemalist elite, however, has always been skeptical about the real intentions of Erdoğan 
and created a rather disorganized opposition: the Turkish Armed Forces, high judiciary and 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). This loose coalition acted in 
tandem in the Presidential elections of 2007, a time when the Turkish political arena was shaken 
by a new kind of military intervention; e-memorandum (e-muhtıra) (Aydınlı 2011, 227-231). 
The Turkish Armed Forces officially warned the AKP government via its website. It was also 
a war of symbols that the wife of Gül [Presidential candidate] wore the headscarf, which was 
considered a threat by the abovementioned secularist coalition. Large demonstrations, called 
Republican Meetings, were organized by opposition groups, at which hardline secularist 
sentiments entwined with ultranationalist and anti-Western messages were aired (Çınar 2011, 
107-112). Erdoğan and his party were targeted by the tutelary bureaucracy, judiciary and 
military, only to come out stronger. With a contra-declaration the government stated that the 
General Staff was accountable to government and reminded the Army of its position in the 
Constitution. The disorganized secular coalition had failed; Gül was eventually elected 
President and the AKP increased its votes by 10 percent in the 2007 general elections. Once 
again Erdoğan was a victim of the tutelary system and he had won against it (Balcı 2007, 237-
242). 
 
Rather than becoming a hero in the eyes of pro-democracy groups and increasing his charisma 
and democratic legitimacy in Western capitals, Erdoğan opted to change the system concerning 
the election of President via a referendum. This would later prove to be a well-calculated move 
because he had been able to get his comrade, Gül, elected as President and paved the way for a 
Presidential system. The President therefore was going to be elected by a popular vote and only 
for 5 years. Representing the people’s will directly, the President became much stronger, in 
terms of popular legitimacy, if not in legal-Constitutional terms. The amendments were 
approved by an overwhelming 68.95% majority. The crisis-turned-opportunity had helped 
Erdoğan to change the system and facilitated his personalized rule by loading the Presidency 
with much needed legitimacy for an executive President (Selçuk 2016, 572-574). 
 
Until 2010, the AKP had declared that despite being the elected government, they lacked 
absolute control over the military and civilian bureaucracy. There was an unspoken 
understanding in the party elite on the need to take over the bureaucracy and major state 
apparatuses. AKP had realized the unaccountable power of high bureaucracy in the Turkish 
state structure the hard way. Relying on a referendum in 2010 that he won by 58% and a 
following general election in 2011 by 49.5%. Erdoğan knew that he was popular enough to take 
on the Kemalist bureaucracy. Furthermore, he had an implicit agreement with the Gülen 
Movement to dismantle the bureaucratic monopoly of the well-established secular elite. 
Fethullah Gülen publicly declared his position and urged his followers to support the 
amendments framed by the AKP (Öztürk 2014, 114). The amendments were an incoherent 
mixture; while some of them promoted universally accepted norms of liberal democracy and 
human rights, others were controversial and therefore created a heated public debate. The 
referendum was the greatest challenge of the AKP against bureaucratic tutelage up to that time. 
However, Erdogan regret from most changes of referendum in high judiciary because the 
referendum had made the judiciary more resistant to the encroachments of the executive.  
 
Another challenge for the AKP was the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. The allegations were 
extremely serious in both cases: High ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces had planned 
military interventions multiple times. The suspects were mostly military officers and they had 
been jailed while their trials were pending. The AKP government had established prosecutors 
with special authorities for these cases and Erdoğan publicly declared himself to be “the 
prosecutor of these cases”vi blurring the line between the executive and judiciary. All the while, 
Gülen-affiliated news organs supported the trials as much as the pro-government media and 
this created a widespread perception of an alliance between the Gülen Movement and AKP 
government. The alliance was not limited to popular support; the AKP was able to utilize the 
influence of the Gülen Movement in the judiciary to dismantle the Kemalist tutelage (Öztürk 
2014, 115).  
 
The period between 2013-2016 was full of social and political turmoil which was utilized by 
Erdoğan and the AKP as a pretext for a less lawful and more personal rule. One of the critical 
issues was the Gezi Park Protests which started on 27 May 2013 when excavators attempted to 
demolish Taksim’s Gezi Park, a rare urban green space in downtown Istanbul. The government, 
with an executive decision, wished to replace Gezi Park with a reconstruction of the historical 
Halil Pasha Artillery Barracks that would host shopping malls and residences. The protests, 
which were started to save the park and therefore Taksim Square by a group of 
environmentalists, later turned into a nation-wide uprising with almost 3 million participants 
and protests in 79 cities across Turkey. There were 11 deaths and almost 8,000 injuries in 13 
cities.vii Demonstrations brought together people from very different camps, including liberals, 
socialists, EU supporters, nationalists, Kurds, social democrats, secularists as well as pious 
individuals that opposed the policies of the AKP. For many protestors, it was not only about a 
park; but about having a voice, saving democracy, freedom of opinion and diversity. Police 
brutality provoked anger amongst protestors and Erdoğan publicly admitted that he personally 
gave orders to the police chief himself. He then called the protestors “a bunch of bandits” 
(birkaç çapulcu).viii Erdoğan also threatened the participants with a civil war by taking his 
supporters to the streets to respond to them in violence.  
 
The second crisis of 2013 stemmed from a corruption investigation that included Erdoğan, four 
ministers of his cabinet and their relatives: the 17-25 December alleged corruption scandal.ix 
Having not denied at first the alleged corruption, Erdoğan utilized the pro-government media 
and attacked the prosecution claiming that the judges, prosecutors and police officers were 
affiliated with the Gülen Movement and that the whole effort was a judicial coup aimed at 
ousting him. Within days, all the prosecutors and leading police officers involved in the 
investigation were re-assigned and the case was practically stopped. Then phone recordings 
which were collected legitimately throughout the investigation as evidence of corruption were 
leaked to the internet. Erdoğan then denied their legitimacy and started a campaign claiming 
the recordings were manufactured and that they were either dubbed or montaged (Saatçioğlu 
2016, 133-146). Erdoğan and the AKP managed to mobilize his supporters with an anti-Gülen 
rally. Although corruption allegations were identified and documented by the Turkish National 
Intelligence Agency, the prosecution was successfully portrayed as a coup against Turkish 
democracy, therefore a threat for the whole country.  
 
Gezi Protests and the corruption investigations had posed a great challenge for Erdoğan and the 
AKP. It had become clear that there was a significant public resistance against their 
authoritarian policies. Furthermore, they had gone through a split with their biggest 
consolidator, the Gülen Movement. With a less-than-democratic but popularly successful 
management, they came out stronger from the two crises. The new target was changing the 
political system from parliamentary democracy to presidential rule. Parliament had already 
passed a law which foresaw the election of the President by popular vote in 2012. Representing 
the popular will directly, the President would have a much greater legitimacy as an executive 
actor. If Erdoğan was elected President, he would transcend the Prime Ministry and continue 
leading the cabinet as long as the AKP remained in power.  
 
The AKP then continued its political success, winning the local elections in 2014 (Çarkoğlu 
2014, 99-103). Afterwards, Erdoğan declared his candidacy for President and won more than 
52% of the votes, being elected the 12th President of Turkey for a period of five years. Since 
the President had to be non-partisan according to the Turkish Constitution, Erdoğan was obliged 
to leave the chair of AKP de facto and de jure. However, he continued to lead his party de facto 
to the point of organizing rallies for it. In the process of the June 2015 elections, he campaigned 
for 400 seats for the AKP in Parliament and used a rather interesting tone; ‘give me 400 seats 
in Parliament and this issue will be solved in peace’.x However, AKP lost its parliamentary 
majority at the June 2015 elections, for the first time in its political journey. It had lost about 5 
percent of its votes because of the negative effects of the corruption investigations and 
Erdoğan’s ascension to Presidency (Kemahlıoğlu 2016).  
 
Despite the fact that the results of the June 2015 election pointed to a coalition government, 
none of the political parties other than the CHP and HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi- 
Peoples’ Democratic Party) wanted to establish one. The AKP government then started some 
disproportionate military operations in the predominantly Kurdish South-eastern cities against 
the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê- Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and declared a regional 
state of emergency with the consent and order from Erdoğan. In the following process, 
explosions took place in Ankara and Istanbul claiming the lives of more than one hundred 
people. Erdoğan was more than ready to jump in as the saviour of the people and called for a 
firm fight against terrorism including ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and PKK. The 
atmosphere of insecurity played into his hands, as he claimed he was the only leader strong 
enough to defend the country. With the fight against terrorism Erdoğan got bolder, more 
nationalistic and less accountable. His firm stance paid off and once again the AKP got the 
majority in the November 2015 elections.  
 
After all these events the military coup attempt of 15 July 2016 only created even more social 
and political trauma. To the best of public knowledge, a medium sized group of flag officers of 
the Turkish army attempted a coup d’état against Erdoğan and the AKP government. Although 
the leading group of the plotters called themselves the “Peace at Home Council” there was no 
clarity about who the members were. Publically, Erdoğan used his popularity and called people 
onto the streets. The attempt had started about 8-9 pm and was over before the morning, 
claiming 265 lives and leaving 2,797 people wounded. All four political parties in Parliament 
stood united against the coup attempt. Within the first hour, Erdoğan accused the Gülen 
Movement as being behind the attempt.xi 
 
Five days after the attempted coup, the AKP government declared a state of emergency for 
three months, which would subsequently be extended third times. The government then started 
ruling the country with statutory decrees. The justification for the state of emergency was that 
the conditions were grave and the government needed to take swift and effective measures. Due 
to the shock and trauma of the failed coup the first weeks went by without any opposition to 
the government and its measures. Erdoğan constantly claimed that the people and the state of 
Turkey were facing an existential threat and that the measures were dedicated to their survival. 
Therefore, the extraordinary and extra-legal measures should have been evaluated in this 
context. Law was not enough to remove the threat and Erdoğan was the one to decide what the 
exception was as the ruler of the country. However, the measures far exceeded the justifiable 
scope and were not easy to link with the coup attempt: Within the first three months of the state 
of emergency, 35 medical establishments, 934 private teaching institutions, 109 private student 
dormitories, 104 foundations, 1,125 associations, 15 private universities, 19 unions, 45 
newspapers, 15 journals, 18 TV stations, and 29 publishing houses, most of which were run by 
the Gülen Movement, were closed down. More than 111 thousand civil servants were fired 
from public institutions. More than 7 thousand of them were employed in the judiciary, while 
10 thousand were army officials and about 50 thousand in the education ministry. 2,500 
journalists lost their jobs. More than 36 thousand people were arrested.xii 
 
Since they were no longer a threat, Erdoğan turned his attention to pro-Kurdish groups. In the 
post-coup process, all pro-Kurdish print and visual media organs were shut down.xiii The 
autonomy of the judiciary was lost altogether and prosecutors were acting like persecutors of 
the opposition. The co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party were arrested along 
with 10 other members of parliament.xiv Municipal mayors of many Kurdish majority cities and 
districts were arrested and administrators were appointed in their place.xv The people who 
obtained their positions by popular vote were being replaced by appointed bureaucrats. Another 
crackdown in the post-coup process affected the oldest newspaper in the country: Cumhuriyet. 
Cumhuriyet’s secular and Kemalist line of publication positioned the paper in opposition to 
Erdoğan’s Islamism. A group of columnists and editors of Cumhuriyet were arrested with the 
accusation of aiding the PKK and Gülen Movement.xvi The accusation was less-than-
convincing because it is very difficult to juxtapose PKK and the Gülen Movement. It is nearly 
impossible to link Cumhuriyet with any of the two, let alone the three of them acting in tandem. 
The coup attempt had turned out to be a gift from Godxvii for Erdoğan, who was using it to 
surgically remove the opposition that would resist the Presidential system.  
 
The Proposed Constitution and its problems: Timing, Context and Human Rightsxviii 
 
The most obvious instrumentalisation of the post-failed coup emergency was ordered by 
Erdogan; the new constitutional draft that sought to change the parliamentary regime of Turkey 
into a presidential one, clearing the way for Erdogan to rule the country at least until 2029 were 
swiftly approved in the Grand National Assembly with the support of the nationalist MHP, 
which made the main opposition party CHP’s resistance completely ineffective after the 
imprisoning and harassment of the pro-Kurdish HDP deputies in parliament. The leading 
figures of the AKP and MHP defended the move to practically end the separation of powers by 
arguing that Turkey needed a strong leadership and a sustainable stability, and to thus erase all 
the components of military and bureaucratic tutelage.   
 
The new constitution was drafted under the blanket of a state of emergency that went far beyond 
measures against military and bureaucratic tutelage, without the consent of the other parties in 
Parliament. Furthermore, parliament had already been side-lined by the emergency rule decrees 
of Erdoğan, and was put to the vote under the same conditions of the suspension of due process 
in the rule of law. The opponents of the amendment, including the CHP and HDP, argued that 
transferring the executive authority of the parliament to the president and making him 
completely immune to judicial accountability would inevitably establish a dictatorship under 
Erdogan. By allowing the President to maintain party affiliation, they say, single-party rule will 
be secured at the expense of destroying minority parties and weakening checks and balances. 
In the context of the deep polarization that Turkey has been struggling with, this new divide 
over a regime change will further deepen the cracks in the fabric of  society and accelerate the 
risk of civil war.xix  
 
Furthermore, one may easily claim that the new constitutional amendments offer a crystal clear 
regime and system changes from parliamentary democracy to an exclusively presidential one. 
Taking into account all of the historical background of Turkish democratization and the AKP’s 
authoritarian shift it is true that the new system could bring about one-man rule with patrimonial 
and patriarchal mentalities that would directly affect human rights and liberties negatively. In 
his study, Uvin divided human rights into five different categories: political, economic, social, 
civic and cultural. Based on a historical explanation Uvin demonstrates that presidential 
systems with a lack of democratic culture and a strong system of checks and balances with a 
highly transparent bureaucracy could harm these human rights categories starting from the 
political and economic ones. After that, these kinds of systems would affect the social, civic 
and cultural rights that embody freedom of thought and speech (Uvin 2004). In this regard, as 
mentioned previously, the existing situation of human rights and liberties has been getting 
worse since the beginning of 2010 under the strict dominance of Erdoğan. The legalisation of 
this situation open a huge gap in the wall of human rights and liberties. 
 
Although there are a great many studies that make similar claims to Uvin, according to the 
Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, with the new amendments Turkey will be ruled by a 
strong presidential government and be completely saved from the risk of instability caused by 
coalition governments. Despite the erasure of the post of Prime Minister by the new 
constitution, he said: “Parliament ... is being strengthened, while the presidency, in charge of 
the executive branch, is being restructured to end conflicts between branches… There will only 
be strong leadership now.xx” The authorities that will be granted to the President are as wide as 
possible, allowing for presidential decrees that do not require parliamentary approval, and also 
giving him the authority to appoint public officials as well as half of the high court judges. 
  
Article eight of the amendment establishes that the President will have the power to issue 
executive decrees without a need for parliamentary ratification or legislation except in times of 
a state of emergency, and except on matters of fundamental rights, individual rights and duties 
listed in the unchanged articles of the Constitution.xxi Although the parliament partially retains 
its legislative power on paper, the de facto state of rule in Turkey signals that the presidential 
decrees will be the norm rather than the exception in the new regime. It is also likely to see 
frequent clashes of power within the executive branch, as the legislative power of Parliament 
is still in force in the current Constitution. Yet it is designed in such a way that it will be 
impossible for the parliament to rule against the President, especially within the context of a 
party-state union. The President can send the laws back to parliament in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration; and in that case, the Parliament needs a majority of 301 votes out of 600 seats 
(there are currently 550) in order to pass that law. This means that unless they gain a majority 
of 51 percent in the parliament, the parties other than the president’s party will have no chance 
of blocking or resisting legislation.  
 
According to this new amendment, as may be understood from the above paragraph, the power 
of parliament will be almost entirely extinguished. That is, the open discussions on different 
issues by the representatives of different social components will be silenced and/or  deactivated. 
This in spite of the fact that Turkey is a country that has a great many different minorities in 
terms of gender, social class, religion and ethnicity. From this point of view, under the new 
constitution, the rights of LGBT people, Alevis, non-Muslims, Kurds, Armenians and other 
non-majoritarian groups will be abandoned in favour of one-man rule by a person who will 
mainly represents the majority and their rights in order to extend his/her political journey. As 
mentioned previously minority rights is one of the fundamental pillars of human rights and 
liberties, thus the amended constitution will again harm the quality of human rights and liberties 
in Turkey with its pro-majoritarian structure. 
 
The amended constitution also carries the risk of arbitrary or prolonged periods of state of 
emergency, as it grants the President the sole authority to decide this. Again, in article eight of 
the amendments, this state of emergency covers martial law as well as state of emergency 
regulations in the Constitution. This allows the President to rule the country by presidential 
decree and request the parliament to extend the period by up to four months, which will not 
apply in the event of a war.  Another power handed to the President in the same article is the 
ability to restructure all the ministries and public institutions and deciding whether to abolish 
or change a ministry branch or add a new one simply by issuing a presidential decree. Not only 
the ministers of the government, but also all the senior civil servants (the definition is left open 
with the possibility to include rectors of universities, police heads and military force 
commanders) will be subject to a presidential decree in their appointments. This new regulation 
seems to give rights to the authority to establish an arbitrary and sustainable state of emergency. 
Yet, as noted previously, Turkey’s history regarding states of emergency does not inspire 
confidence. Restrictions imposed under the state of emergency have always gone beyond those 
permissible under international human rights law, including unjustifiable limitations on media 
freedom and the right to freedom of expression. 
 
The structure of an independent judiciary branch is seriously harmed in the amended 
constitution, reducing the members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakim ve 
Savcɪlar Yüksek Kurulu -HSYK) from 22 to 12, half of them to be directly appointed by the 
President, and the other half to be elected by Parliament according to article fourteen in the 
constitutional amendment. The HSYK is the body that runs all proceedings of the courts: the 
appointment, promotion, disciplining or firing of judges and prosecutors, abolition or creation 
of courts or changes to their territorial jurisdictions. In other words, in a system where the 
President and the majority in Parliament are from one political party, this will practically mean 
that the judiciary will be under the total control of a single political authority.  Regarding the 
independent structure of the judiciary two different points should be mentioned. First of all, the 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner noted in 1985 that: “The 
independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution 
or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and 
observe the independence of the judiciary.” And, “the judiciary shall decide matters before 
them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, 
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from 
any quarter or for any reason.”xxii However, the new constitutional amendments will take the 
independent structure of the judiciary and hand it over to the patrimonial relationship 
mechanisms of the one-man regime.  
 
Furthermore, one of the fundamental notions of human rights and freedoms is the concept of 
tolerance balanced by an independent judiciary. However, the creators of this constitutional 
amendment have little tolerance for any kind of individual opposition and its expression. During 
Erdoğan’s time in as President he has filed more defamation cases than all the previous 
presidents. In less than three years more than three thousand individuals have been prosecuted 
for insulting the President. From this point of view, it is possible to speculate that now the 
constitutional amendments have been approved by the referendum, most of these individuals 
would by constitutionalising article eight, fourteen and and ten. [my italics-this sentence can 
be deleted. It doesn’t make sense and is unnecessary] 
 
Along the same line of subduing the judiciary branch to the strong executive branch, the 
accountability of the President is made even more difficult with the new Constitution. 
According to article two of the amendments, impeachment proceedings against the President 
may be commenced by the signatures of 301 deputies in the proposed 600-seat parliament. Then 
Parliament will set up an inquiry commission by the secret ballot of 360 deputies, and if the 
commission decides the President should be tried at the Supreme Court, this will only be 
possible with a secret ballot of 400 deputies, according to article fourteen. Moreover, these 
provisions will still apply even after the President’s term ends, which implies a lifetime of 
unaccountability for the President.  
 
One final regulation that strengthens the authority of the President concerns re-election, as 
according to the amended constitution parliamentary elections will be held every five years 
instead of four, on the same day as the Presidential elections. Instead of allowing Parliament to 
hold a snap election by a vote of 139 deputies out of 550, as previously, the amended 
constitution requires 360 of the 600 deputies, according to article two. Under these provisions, 
Parliament is given only the slimmest chance to call for an election in spite of the President. 
The President is allowed to be elected for a second term, but it is also possible to run for a third 
term if he/she makes a call for a new parliament during his/her second term. Indeed, the 
amended constitution makes it possible for the President to serve for life by not putting any 
obstacle to this authority of closing and reopening parliament.  
 
As noted previously, the first constitution in Turkish history was the Kanun-i Esasi adopted in 
1876, which was not the result of a popular will, but drafted by a group of educated elites called 
‘The Young Ottomans.’ According to this constitution, the Ottoman dynasty held 
unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty. The Sultan’s person was deemed ‘sacred’ and all 
executive and legislative powers belonged to him. Although the judicial power was considered 
independent, the Sultan had the right to grant amnesty. The citizens were granted all basic rights 
except for the freedom to gather and form political parties or organizations. The law promised 
to guarantee the citizens’ lives, properties, honour and immunity of residence; yet this judicial 
guarantee was deeply flawed as the Sultan could still exile people after a police investigation, 
on the grounds that they constituted a threat for the state. Looking at the 2017 amended 
constitution promising a strong presidency with weaker judicial independence, one cannot help 
but ask what is exactly new after 140 years in the constitutional journey of Turkey.  
 
Under these conditions, far beyond any discussions as to whether there is anything wrong with 
replacing the classical parliamentary system with a presidential system, the problematic points 
exist in three different areas: timing, general context and fundamental human rights. 
 
It is obvious that the amended constitution will give huge and almost uncontrollable power to 
both the current president and future charismatic leaders, but this is the main problem of the 
situation. The first problem concerns the timing of the proposed constitution in two ways. First 
of all, the constitutional amendments were prepared after the failed coup attempt under the state 
of emergency. Furthermore, it would be possible to argue that there were no negotiation and 
consensus processes held by the different sides. Under these exceptional conditions, the 
regulator of the state of emergency is an open side of the campaign that occurs that there is no 
fair and free companying process.  
 
In terms of general context, under this amended constitution there will be no political bargaining 
among the different groups in Turkey. Erdoğan and his supporters say the changes will 
streamline decision-making and end a system that divides power between a prime minister and 
a president. As noted previously, the amended Constitution will also allow a president to be the 
official head of his party, something not previously permitted, but it will limit the president to 
two terms. In this regard, even though it seems that the changes will maintain the separation of 
powers and democratic checks on the president, it is quite obvious that the legal changes are 
intended to confirm the de facto dominance of the President in the state apparatus. Furthermore, 
the changes to the constitution also assume the establishment of the President’s de facto control 
over the sphere of justice. There are plans to reform the Supreme Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors, the highest disciplinary body in the Turkish judiciary, which also has broad powers 
to take personnel decisions. This mechanism means that the head of state will in practice have 
control of the judiciary. 
 
Both the timing and contextual problems affect human rights. Most respected sources mention 
that human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever an individual’s place of 
residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. 
Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, 
customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. 
International human rights law lays down obligations for states to act in certain ways or to 
refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of individuals or groups. Yet, with this amended constitution both the decisions and 
classical management institutions of the country will be handed over to one executive office 
and this office will also gain an ability to confiscate assets, declare a state of emergency and 
delegate legislation with no audit context of high judiciary and international authorities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This article explains the recent course of Turkish politics and the new amended constitution 
within the context of human rights. In this regard, it first explains the historical journey of 
Turkey’s constitutional establishment. Furthermore, it mentions the long, discriminating and 
controversial political journey of the AKP under the intensive impact of its indisputable leader 
Erdoğan. It argues that many extreme political and social situations and the leadership dexterity 
of Erdoğan over time can best be expressed as a ceaseless will for power. The early struggle 
with the tutelary bureaucracy of Turkey signifies no loyalty to democracy in the light of recent 
rapid authoritarianism. Finally, the article explains some of the new articles in the constitution 
and demonstrates their political, legal and sociological output and claims that the objective 
system introduced will extinguish all constitutional memory and will reveal restrictions on 
human rights since there is no legal guarantee of basic rights and freedoms in the text. 
Consequently, it would be fair to say that especially since 2010 the AKP and its indisputable 
leadership mechanism have been making themselves more and more authoritarian. This is 
something that has been noted not only in scholars’ works but also in various international data. 
Under these circumstances, there has been a significant decline in the rule of law, freedom of 
speech and other fundamental human rights. However, this gradually declining process gained 
great momentum after the failed coup attempt since the ruling structure has found a tool to 
instrumentalise their decisions and policy plans.  
 Yet, it is fair to say that no one is happy regarding the results of Turkey’s controversial 
referendum. According to the almost official resultsxxiii, it is quite obvious that the ‘yes’ votes 
had a narrow lead. However, ‘no’ votes were ahead in Turkey’s biggest cities like Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir. It should also be noted that despite allegations of serious vote rigging, 
blunders by the Higher Election Council and strong evidence of undemocratic practices in the 
run up, the race was very tight.xxiv Furthermore, it seems that the CHP, the main opposition 
party, is going to object to the results on the grounds of some infractions of the rules on polling. 
This means that even if the official result is ‘yes’, this was one of the most debatable electoral 
processes in Turkey. But, frankly, Erdoğan, who has been in control of the entire state apparatus 
for a long time now, will never allow any result other than ‘yes’. 
  
Under these disputable circumstances, although the supporters of Erdoğan will see the results 
of the referendum as the official start of a ‘new Turkey’ era, we cannot be that precise. Since, 
first of all, the results show that polarisation in Turkey has reached a peak. While half of the 
population is willing to deliver their will to Erdoğan, the rest is strongly against him and his 
authoritarian and pro-Islamic policies. Secondly, with the result of the referendum, the one-man 
rule of Erdoğan has become constitutional, but it is also crystal clear that the educated classes 
and young generation are against him and it is apparent that it will be hard for him to run the 
country with his previous authoritarian habits. In this regard, the result of the referendum is not 
an end, it is just the beginning of a new era of struggle between pro-Erdoğanists and the rest. 
Yet, this is almost obvious that it seems that the last political moment is the new constitution 
that gives the president more and more power includes pay-pass the parliament and 
international subordinated conjunction which would be related with international human rights. 
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